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Abstract
We focus on ways and means of solidarity and their more or less voluntary and 
involuntary character. Alternative ways of redistribution are modeled by combining 
redistribution as emergent from a non-discriminatory voluntary contribution mecha-
nism, VCM, with an outside option for a “super-rich”, R, participant to donate to 
VCM participants. The outsider may discriminate between participants of the VCM 
on the basis of information accessible at a cost to her. Inclusion in and exclusion 
from the VCM are involuntary while contributions in it are voluntary. How invol-
untary inclusion of R in VCM affects her discriminatory voluntary donations and 
contribution behavior is explored experimentally.
Keywords Compulsory solidarity · Collective goods · Charitable giving · Inequality
JEL Cliassification C72 · C91 · C92 · D63 · D64 · H44
1 Introduction
The institutions providing the services that we identify with rule of law and 
the regulatory framework within which modern markets operate are state spon-
sored and financed by coercive taxes. In the sense of imposing regulations and 
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raising compulsory contributions even the most minimal is a welfare state of 
sorts. Beyond the protective as a minimum welfare state all advanced legal orders 
also are productive states. They also (“productively”) provide minimal guarantees 
of income that are financed by compulsory taxes.
According to ideals of substantively equal treatment under rule of law stand-
ards redistributive policies must be non-discriminatory (see Kliemt 1993; 
Buchanan and Congleton 2006; Oprea 2019 in this volume of HOEC).
Non-discrimination in redistributive policies suggests demogrant schemes of 
equal guarantees of basic income for all citizens, as are nowadays propagated in 
particular by the political left (see Van Parijs 1992), were favored originally by 
classical liberals [most prominently by Friedman (1962) with his proposal of what 
he called a “negative income tax”]. While their popularity is still on the ascent on 
the left of the political spectrum, unconditional basic income guarantees became 
increasingly unpopular among many liberal adherents of free markets (including 
those who otherwise think of Milton Friedman as their intellectual hero).
This paper acknowledges that, to the extent that it could be financed within 
financial constraints, redistribution via demogrant schemes is attractive. But it 
also acknowledges fundamental concerns about non-discriminatory compulsory 
solidarity as “embodied” in demogrant schemes. Taking sides with either the 
political left or the political right in this controversy is not among the aims of the 
paper. Rather than presenting conventional normative arguments it approaches 
certain aspects of the controversy experimentally.
The results of the experiments presented below speak to three central objec-
tions against implementing non-discriminatory (equal) basic income as “compul-
sory solidarity”:
1. Non-discriminatory or unconditional (not means-tested) claims to basic income 
would induce those who are conventionally regarded as “non-deserving poor” 
to opt out of the labor market. Other than the adherents of unconditional basic 
income, the “resenters” do not regard it as a public good to help the poor regard-
less of the causes of poverty. Due to such widespread resentment, the claim that 
providing non-discriminatory compulsory solidarity amounts to a Pareto improve-
ment is precarious at best. Moreover, the scheme might not survive at the polls 
in a democracy. (In view of this it is not accidental that mandatory basic “social 
security” which amounts to an earmarked tax is camouflaged as “social insur-
ance” in countries like Germany).
2. Many adherents of free societies not only resent the non-discriminatory but also 
the coercive nature of compulsory solidarity implemented as unconditional basic 
income. For them solidarity has moral merit only to the extent that it is voluntary. 
Accepting that ought presupposes can the demand for voluntariness translates into 
demanding that solidarity should be voluntary to the maximum viable extent.
3. Moreover, many adherents of rule of law and free market societies believe that 
relying on the fundamental coercive power of the state in exercising solidarity 
tends to crowd out the basic proclivity of humans to help their fellows voluntarily 
and/or to self-help by means of voluntary associations. They would typically add 
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that in free market societies in particular the super-rich—the Rockefellers, War-
ren Buffets and Bill and Melinda Gates types—have been and still are willing to 
voluntarily help the deserving poor. Since voluntary donors are legally entitled to 
discriminate, they can select the deserving poor in targeted ways and thus exercise 
solidarity more efficiently than the state sponsored compulsory solidarity schemes 
that under the rule of law constraints rein in discrimination by state agencies and 
agents.
In our comparative institutional analysis we will focus on ways and means of 
redistribution and their more or less voluntary and involuntary character. We will 
do so in terms of alternative rules and how they affect experimental laboratory inter-
actions. More specifically, alternative ways of redistribution are modeled by com-
bining redistribution as emergent from a non-discriminatory voluntary contribution 
mechanism, VCM, with an outside option open to a “super-rich” participant. The 
super-rich may discriminate in her redistributive voluntary donations. She can do so 
on the basis of information accessible at a cost to her.
We distinguish two cases of “institutional settings” as represented in the labora-
tory. In one case to which we refer as partial compulsory solidarity, PCS, the super-
rich is not a participant of the VCM but can interact with the “non-rich” partici-
pants. Her options are either granting or withholding donations which she may or 
may not base on information on whether the recipients are deserving or not. In the 
other case, to which we refer as exemplifying general compulsory solidarity, GCS, 
the super-rich individual participates in the VCM that distributes indiscriminately 
equal shares of the common pool to each participant (independent of wealth and 
largely independent of contributions). In GCS as in PCS, besides contributing to the 
common pool, the super-rich can still exercise solidarity in targeted ways.
The two precedingly sketched settings should offer some insights concerning 
how being involuntarily included in a general solidarity scheme, GCS, as opposed to 
being an outsider to it, PCS, affects voluntary contributions of the super-rich and the 
non-rich (in and outside the VCM). Before we turn to our experimental exploration 
a few remarks on related literature may be helpful and, in any event, appropriate.
Certain collective or public good experiments share certain aspects of our PCS 
and GCS conditions. Since Isaac and Walker (1988), wealth asymmetry via heter-
ogeneous endowments has been frequently explored experimentally (Kachelmeier 
and Shehata 1997; Chan et  al. 1996; Cason and Khan 1999; Buckley and Croson 
2006) what allows to test for equal endowment shares of voluntary contributions.1 
The crowding out of charitable donations is explored by Blanco et al. 2012 (see also 
Bekkers and Wiepking 2011; Wiepking and Bekkers 2012 for surveys). So far there 
has been no focus on retrieving costly information beforehand. Like in GCS, where 
we allow the super-rich to participate in collective good provision and to donate. 
Some experiments let participants not only contribute but also reward (or sanction) 
others (Fehr and Gächter 2000; 2002; Andreoni et  al. 2003; Masclet et  al. 2003; 
1 There exist other forms of asymmetry in linear public good experiments (Smith 2011; Kölle 2015; 
Chowdhury and Jeon 2014; Cason and Khan 1999).
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Sefton et al. 2007; Sutter et al. 2010). In our setup, charitable donations can be used 
to self-servingly influence collective good contributions of the non-wealthy.
In experimental research, generosity is typically operationalized as dictatorial 
reward allocation, as studied early in social psychology (Mikula 1972; Shapiro 
1975) and later via impunity and dictator games (List 2007). In both our conditions 
the single super-rich is an allocator confronting several recipients, what renders 
both conditions rather unusual (see Engel 2011, for a meta study). Due to the nearly 
exclusive focus on dyadic interaction (Forsythe et  al. 1994; Eckel and Grossman 
1996; Engelmann and Strobel 2004) dictatorial reward allocation experiments with 
more than one recipient are not very common (Bolton et al. 1998; Selten and Ocken-
fels 1998; Engelmann and Strobel 2004, 2007).
In both PCS and GCS different fairness norms can apply. In the absence of a 
contribution norm and without punishment, low contributions have to be expected 
(Reuben and Riedl 2013).2 The less discriminatory GCS should trigger stronger sol-
idarity concerns and render it, on average, the better institutional condition without 
inducing a contribution norm (Keser et al. 2017). One may also compare R-individ-
uals with privileged groups (Reuben and Riedl 2009) with no freeriding incentive in 
their donating activities outside VCM.
Section 2 describes the experimental protocols in more detail. Section 3 reports 
the main results, separately for voluntarily contributing in PCS and GCS and simi-
larly for voluntary donations by R-participants whose choice tasks depend more cru-
cially on the institution. Finally, the payoffs in case of PCS and GCS are compared 
before concluding in Sect. 4.
2  Experimental Protocols
Partial Compulsory Solidarity, PCS, excludes the super-rich, R, from the solidarity 
group. R is neither obliged to participate in the VCM nor entitled to an equal share 
of its benefits. General Compulsory Solidarity, GCS, differs from PCS by including 
R in the group interaction under the VCM.
Under both, PCS and GCS conditions, R has the option to improve the situation 
of specific other actors through “donations” to others. To target donations R can, 
at a private cost to her, retrieve information about individual contributions of oth-
ers under the VCM. (PCS and GCS are not alternative treatments in the technical 
sense. In particular, including R in GCS increases the number of contributors with-
out adjusting individual freeriding incentives).
An experimental society includes six members, one R, three P, and two M. The 
M- are less well-off than R- but better-off than P-types. The class specific individ-
ual initial endowments for R, M, P are, respectively, = 560, = 60 and = 20 ECU 
(Experimental Currency Unit with 100 ECU = €8). This yields a total endowment 
of 560 + 2 · 60 + 3 · 20 = 740; that is, nearly 75% of wealth is allocated to R. In the 
2 Field observations confirm that participation to social activities in local communities is significantly 
lower the more heterogeneous the community is Alesina and La Ferrara (2000).
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following we also refer to super-rich R as “wealthy” and to all M and P as “non-
wealthy”. The instructions refer to three different types as P- M- and R- type.
As indicated already we refer to PCS and GCS not as treatments but as institutional 
conditions of an exploratory exercise in comparative institutional analysis of PCS and 
GCS (Plott 1997; Roth and Sotomayor 1992). In PCS, but not in GCS, R can volun-
tarily contribute to the collective good from which in PCS only the non-wealthy, and, 
in GCS, all benefit equally. The non-negative integer contributions cpi , cmj and cr for 
i = 1, 2, 3 and j = 1, 2 , may not exceed 20 ECU, corresponding to the wealth con-
straint  = 20 of the poor. M-types can contribute only up to one-third of their endow-
ment. In GCS, R is also subject to this constraint on voluntary donations in the VCM 
and thus can donate only up to 1/28 of  = 560. Payoffs of the linear collective good 
games of five, PCS, respectively six, GCS, contributors assume the same MPCR of 0.4.
Even when R is not engaged in collective good provision, R 
– as all others – is informed about its rules and about the total contribution 
C = cm1 + cm2 + cp1 + cp2 + cp3 in PCS and C + cr in GCS. Before possibly donating, 
R can purchase information concerning individual contributions, cp1, cp2, cp3, cm1 
and cm2 at a cost for each information retrieval (mirroring that in the field informa-
tion search is in general costly). After receiving the information she has paid for, R 
decides on how much of the remaining endowment (560 minus the sum of informa-
tion costs) she will donate to M1 , M2 , as well as to P1, P2 and P3.
2.1  Stages of the Decision Process
The Decision Process Involves the Following Stages: First, in PCS the non-wealthy 
(in GCS) determine their contribution level; yielding the total contributions 
C = cp1 + cp2 + cp3 + cm1 + cm2 and C + cr in PCS and in GCS, respectively.
Second, the collective good level C, respectively C + cr , becomes commonly 
known and the non-wealthy learn about their payoff (“wealth”) before possible 
donations by R:




 for P-types in GCS,




 for M-types in GCS,





Third, R can buy information about individual contributions at a cost of 
e = 10ECU each. Depending on the (costly) information R finally decides on how 
much of 560 − n ⋅ e (with n ∈ ℕ , denoting the number of information retrievals) to 
donate to P- and M-types.
After factoring in R’s voluntary targeted donations dpi and dmj for i = 1, 2, 3 and 
j = 1, 2 overall earnings are:
•  − cpi + 0.4C + dpi for P-types in PCS;




+ dpi for P-types in GCS,
•  − cmj + 0.4C + dmj for M-types in PCS;
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In the experiment all participants play 24 periods in two phases of 12 periods 
each. For the first phase six participants are randomly chosen to interact with the 
same partners for twelve periods (partner design). After the first phase again six par-
ticipants are randomly chosen to interact again with the same partners for 12 periods 
(again partner design). Across phases the assignment of specific participants to roles 
R, M, or P remains invariant. Both phases are always played according to either PCS 
or GCS rules.
Of course, such repeated interaction in identical groups allows for both reaction 
to feedback information about past outcomes and anticipation of future effects. For 
instance, non-wealthy participants may hope that R will reward contributions via 
donations in PCS and possibly also by contributing more in GCS. When retriev-
ing information repeatedly, wealthy R can identify other group members as Pi or 
Mj . So, for instance, R could verify whether a specific Pi or Mj increases his volun-
tary contribution after receiving a substantial donation via purchasing the relevant 
information.
After having described how the two institutional alternatives, PCS and GCS, are 
formally defined and experimentally implemented we can compare the two institu-
tional settings PCS and GCS, in particular, with respect to the role of R. In PCS the 
super-rich participant R can influence the payoffs only by redistributive donations 
allocated outside the VCM. In GCS both voluntary contributions and redistributive 
donations are viable for R. A donation costs R one additional unit and provides one 
unit for one of the five others (should R choose to donate to him). In PCS the mar-
ginal rate by which R’s sacrifice of substantive self-interest transforms into benefit 
for (any) “other” is 1. R’s contribution of one unit in GCS generates 0.4 units to each 
of the six members of the solidarity group or in all 6 × 0.4 = 2.4. That is 0.4 units to 
R and 5 × 0.4 = 2 for the five others at a “net” cost of 1–0.4 = 0.6 to self. The trans-
formation rate of the compulsory donation amounts to 2/0.6 = 10/3. This transforma-
tion rate of contributions into collective benefits is more than three times larger than 
the one for the individualized voluntary donations. To put this slightly differently, by 
fully contributing, cr = 20, R could provide 5 × (0.4 × 20) = 40 for the five others at a 
cost of 12 to self while R would have had to sacrifice 5 × 8 = 40 units to generate an 
identical positive effect on each of the other members of the community by her vol-
untary targeted donations outside the VCM.
Compulsory solidarity as construed here is much more effective than voluntary 
solidarity. Yet it is also non-discriminatory. Voluntary donations can discrimi-
nate between the members of the lower endowment classes P and M. Thereby R 
can redistribute in a “retributive” manner and thereby express retributive emotions 
that are generally essential for the workings of moral and legal institutions (Mackie 
1982). She can engage in acts of targeted altruistic reward in both the PCS and the 
GCS setting (as opposed to acts of altruistic punishment that could only be con-
strued as withholding gifts). In GCS as opposed to PCS super-rich R is obliged to 
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participate in VCM. She willy-nilly participates in its benefits whether she volun-
tarily contributes in VCM or not. If she is concerned about fairly contributing to 
VCM she herself has to contribute to non-discriminatory solidarity. Her voluntary 
contributions to VCM may, however, implicitly reward non-deserving others. Tar-
geted donations are more suitable to incentivize contributing behavior of the five 
others. Relying on a comparatively less effective process of transforming costs to 
self- including the necessary costly information retrieval- into benefits for others 
indicates a comparatively strong preference of R for retributive, targeted over non-
discriminatory altruism. This part of the experimental exploration of alternative 
institutional rules clearly speaks to the standard conjecture that the decline of con-
tributions in standard VCM’s is in the first place due to other-regarding resentment 
against free-riding and not so much a consequence of self-regarding motives to free-
ride (normally rather naively discredited as greed).
Final payments are based on one randomly selected period of one randomly 
selected phase. We ran 13 sessions at CESARE laboratory of University Luiss with 
288 students, recruited using Orsee (Greiner 2015) (11 sessions with 24 subjects and 
2 sessions with 12 subjects each); 192 subjects participated in PCS and 96 in GCS. 
Except for the possibility to voluntarily donate, GCS is a rather usual collective 
good design. Compared to this, PCS additionally deviates by excluding R-members 
from collective good provision and deviates more fundamentally from usual collec-
tive good designs. It is because of this that we collected more PCS data. Subjects 
were provided with a hard copy of the instructions, which were read aloud by the 
experimental proctor (for an English translation of the instructions see Sect.  5.1). 
The experiment was fully computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). Overall, 
subjects spent about 80 min in the laboratory, and earned on average €14.30. The 
altogether 24 participants of each session were restricted to two half groups and ran-
domly re-matched after the first phase within the same half group: participants were 
not informed about this restricted re-matching.
3  Results
After analyzing contributions both in PCS and GCS, we discuss the information 
requests and donations by R, by distinguishing and comparing “blind” (in the sense 
of no information retrievals) and “non-blind” donors among R-participants, before 
addressing welfare implications.
3.1  Contribution Behavior
The average contribution dynamics in Fig. 1 for P, M and, in GCS, also R are con-
sistent with the usual decline observed in repeated collective good experiments. 
When R is included, average contributions of P-participants (4.25 in PCS vs. 6.19 in 
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GCS) and M-participants (4.95 in PCS vs. 6.81 in GCS) are significantly higher (p 
values are computed using a bootstrapped t test on group averages (GA) as the unit 
of observation with 1000 bootstrapped samples3; GA p value < 0.001).
Result 1 Compared to PCS the average contributions of P- and M- participants in 
GCS are significantly higher.
There are two main explanations4:
1. the increased efficiency of individual contributions due to including R in GCS 
discourages freeriding,
2. the procedural fairness of GCS crowds in and strengthens solidarity concerns.
In PCS the average M-contribution significantly exceeds the P-contribution (4.95 
vs. 4.25, respectively with GA p value < 0.001). In GCS this difference is also sig-


















M average contribution 
4.954 ( s.d. 6.03 , obs. 1440)
P average contribution 
4.254 ( s.d. 5.56 , obs. 2160)
P average contribution 
6.186 ( s.d. 6.34, obs.1152)
M average contribution 
6.812 ( s.d. 6.59, obs. 768)
R average contribution 
7.961 ( s.d. 7.21, obs. 384)
Fig. 1  Contributions by condition and role
3 To avoid assumptions on the normality of data, all tests are run using the bootstrapped t test method 
with 1000 bootstrap samples. Where possible, the tests also are run on group averages (GA) as the unit of 
observation (Moffatt 2015).
4 This confounding could be avoided by a richer design with intermediate conditions between PCS and 
GCS, for example one letting R gain from contributions in PCS but not contribute, and one letting R 
contribute but not gain from contributions in GCS. Here we are interested in the likely effects of an insti-
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is solidarity across endowment classes even in PCS. R-participants contribute sig-
nificantly more than the others (7.96, with GA p values ≤ 0.001 compared to both, P 
and M).
Result 2 M-members contribute significantly more than P-members in both PCS 
and GCS. Furthermore, R-participants, in GCS, contribute significantly more than 
both P- and M-members.
To answer whether contributions of P and M are boosted by donations and (in 
GCS by) contributions of R, we distinguish no and positive donations and plot indi-
vidual contributions after (not) having received a donation in the previous period. 
Figure 2 clearly reveals that P beneficiaries contribute more, both in PCS and GCS 
(see top section of Table 1). The result is significant for P in both conditions (p val-
ues < 0.001 both in PCS and GCS).5 Positive donations seem to have a positive (and 
significant) effect on M contributions as well (see M section of Table 1). Further-
more, contributions of P and M beneficiaries are significantly different; M-types are 
more cooperative which does not hold when comparing the contributions of P and 
M without prior donation (see bottom section of Table 1).
Although non-R-participants are unaware whether being observed by R over time, 
P- and M-participants may infer this monitoring from changing donations. Figure 3 








0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
PCS GCS
P non-beneficiary P beneficiary








Fig. 2  Contribution by donation received in previous period
5 The p-values, in this case, do not refer to group level analysis due to the specific individual effect of 
donations.
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vs. (more or less) informed R-participants, separately for PCS (left chart) and GCS 
(right chart)6: P and M contributions are lower when R donates blindly than after 
investing in information in t − 1 (see bottom section of Table 1). The non-wealthy 
seem aware of R conditioning donations based on monitoring their individual 
contributions.
Result 3 Voluntary donations of informed R-participants boost voluntary coop-
eration of the non-wealthy
Result 3 suggests that some non-wealthy view R-donations as a bonus system 
according to which R monitors individual contributions and conditions donations 
on individual contributions. Table 2 validates that P and M contributions are posi-
tively correlated to past contribution sum and the received donation.7 Note also that 
Table 1  Pairwise test on contribution by donation received in previous period
We report the p values t test on individual observations bootstrapped with replications on the order of 
1000. “Informed” defines those R-participants retrieving at least one information related to one member 
of the group, i.e., we include in the group “Benefitting from informed R” all members of the group where 
R has bought one/some/all information in the period before
PCS GCS p value
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
P average contribution
 Non-beneficiary 1394 3.846 5.44 594 4.860 5.58 0.000
 Beneficiary 586 4.918 5.76 462 7.773 6.89 0.000
 p value 0.000 0.000
 Benefitting from Informed R 335 5.896 6.07 175 8.886 6.86 0.000
Blind R 251 3.614 5.03 287 7.094 6.84 0.000
 p value 0.000 0.005
M average contribution
 Non-beneficiary 936 3.942 5.51 416 5.481 6.20 0.000
 Beneficiary 384 6.630 6.42 288 8.441 6.57 0.000
 p value 0.000 0.000
 Benefitting from Informed R 221 7.647 6.60 113 9.664 5.96 0.004
Blind R 163 5.252 5.91 175 7.651 6.84 0.001
 p value 0.000 0.012
p value P vs. M beneficiary PCS 0.000
GCS 0.034
p value P vs. M non-beneficiary PCS 0.185
GCS 0.102
6 "Informed" defines those R-participants retrieving at least one information related to one member of 
the group, i.e., we include in the group "benefitting from informed R" all members of the group where R 
has bought one/some/all information in the period before.
7 We provide some robustness check for the tobit estimation; in Sect. 5.2, Table 7 shows the multilevel 
estimations to highlight the possible effect of heterogeneity. The Likelihood-ratio test accepts the null 
hypothesis for all specifications; we do not have between-session or between-group variation.
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P contributions react more strongly to donations by (partially) informed donors (see 
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Fig. 3  P and M contributions by blind and non-blind R 
Table 2  Random-effects tobit 
model regression on P and M 
contributions
Standard errors in parentheses: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Dependent variable P-contribution (1) M-contribution (2)
β S.e. β S.e.
Treatment: GCS 1.823* (1.06) 0.987 (1.30)
Sum contribution (t–1) 0.088*** (0.01) 0.110*** (0.01)
Donation received (t–1) 0.247*** (0.05) 0.071 (0.06)
Uninformed R (t–1) − 0.149 (0.44) − 1.111** (0.56)
Donation received 
(t–1) × Uninformed 
R (t–1)
− 0.211*** (0.06) − 0.031 (0.07)
Female − 0.068 (1.00) 3.330*** (1.23)
Phase − 1.020*** (0.26) − 1.754*** (0.34)
Period − 0.323*** (0.04) − 0.348*** (0.06)
Constant 1.469 (1.70) 2.913 (2.02)
N 3036 2024
8 When separating the analysis by conditions, we find that the interaction result holds only for PCS.
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3.2  Behavior of Wealthy Participants
R-type participants donate on average less than 10 ECU in total (Table 3). While 
redistributive R- donations start off significantly higher in PCS, they significantly 
drop below those in GCS in the second phase.9
The decrease from phase 1 to phase 2 of R-donations applies across conditions 
while being weakly significant in GCS (see the p values of bootstrapped t tests in 
Table 3). Even though R in GCS can more efficiently display solidarity via contrib-
uting rather than donating, this does not crowd out voluntary donations. Actually, 
R-participants in GCS donate as much as in PCS (p value = 0.837): R-participants 
in GCS (PCS) donate 57.6 (39.6) percent of the time when measured as the ratio 
of positive donation sums of each R in each of the 24 periods in which she could 
donate. This implies that average donations in GCS are smaller (Table  3). This 
seems to suggest that at least partly R-donations have been substituted by more effi-
cient voluntary R-contributions in GCS. But do R-participants either donate or con-
tribute? The answer is no: R-participants, who donate, contribute on average 10.27 
whereas those not donating contribute only 4.83 (t test10 p value < 0.001).
Table 3  R-individuals’ average total donations to P only, and M only
We report the p values of t tests on individual observations bootstrapped with replications on the order of 
1000
PCS (720 obs.) GCS (384 obs.) p value
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Donation
 Phase 1 and Phase 2 9.810 28.29 9.549 12.59 0.837
 Phase 1 11.486 35.10 10.625 13.83 0.701
 Phase 2 8.133 19.12 8.474 11.15 0.802
 p values 0.048 0.087
Donation to P
 Phase 1 and Phase 2 5.663 16.79 5.719 8.48 0.944
 Phase 1 6.514 20.63 6.630 9.72 0.938
 Phase 2 4.811 11.73 4.807 6.93 0.000
 p values 0.113 0.024
Donation to M
 Phase 1 and Phase 2 4.147 12.80 3.831 5.75 0.572
 Phase 1 4.972 14.94 3.995 6.04 0.249
 Phase 2 3.322 10.17 3.667 5.45 0.653
p values 0.064 0.570
9 Figure  12 (in Sect.  5.2) displays some outliers, in particular one wealthy individual who donates 
most of her endowment, ID = 44. We removed this wealthy participant and her group from the analysis 
(including all previous results in Sect. 3.1).
10 We perform a t test on individual observations bootstrapped with replications on the order of 1000.
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Table  4 distinguishes three categories of R-participants, based on the average 
donation in each phase: those donating virtually nothing, and those who, on average, 
donate only small, respectively more substantial amounts. The share of R-partici-
pants not donating is 46.67% in PCS and larger than 28.13% in GCS, whose share 
of “Substantial Donors” is larger than in PCS (28.13% vs. 18.13%). This suggests 
crowding in: R-participants more frequently donate in GCS than in PCS.
Figure 4 distinguishes average donations of R-participants with no and with some 
information retrieval (Fig. 13 in Sect. 5.2 excludes non-donors). The positive differ-
ence in information retrieval between conditions PCS and GCS in phase 1 is signifi-
cant, (p value = 0.03) with GCS being higher, see Fig. 5.
Table 4  Frequency of donor 
types
Classification is based on the sum of the five donations per period. 
The categories represent the average donations in 12 periods of 
a phase. Non-Donors: < 1 ECU; Small Donors: 1–15 ECU; High 
Donors: > 15 ECU
Donor type PCS GCS
Frequency % Frequency %
Non-donors 28 46.67 9 28.13
Small donors 21 45.00 14 43.75
Substantial donors 11 18.33 9 28.13
















(s.d. 28.12, obs. 555)
Info average 
donations 23 .694 
(s.d. 23.99, obs. 
165)
Info average donations 20.711
(s.d. 13.47, obs. 97)
Blind average donations 5.777
(s.d. 9. 74, obs. 287)
Fig. 4  Donation from blind and non-blind R 
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In both conditions, average donations of R-participants with information (referred 
to as “info”) exceed across time those of R-types without information (referred to 
as “blind”) where the differences are strikingly large, see Fig. 4. Apparently (not) 
investing in information goes hand in hand with (not) donating: some R-participants 
keep their eyes closed while generous ones apparently want to learn how needy the 
non-wealthy are and how they could be encouraged similar to principals in princi-
pal-agent models.
Result 4 Information retrieval goes along with donating: the altogether 46 R-par-
ticipants investing in information donate significantly more.
Figures 6 and 7 display how frequency shares of the different R types evolve over 
time. Figure 6 categorizes R-participants into four types: (1) those who donate and 
purchase costly information, (2) those who donate but do so blindly, (3) those who 
purchase information without donating, and (4) those who neither purchase informa-
tion nor donate. In PCS the percentage of R-participants with possibly minimal, pos-
itive donations starts off above 60%. After the first half of the first phase the share of 
R-participants who donate drops by around 50%.11
For GCS, Fig. 7 distinguishes “blind” and “non-blind” donors, and further char-
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average #info 0.493 (s.d. 1.08, obs. 720)
average #info on P 0.285 ( s.d 0.68, obs. 720)
average #info on M 0.208 ( s.d 0.51, , obs. 720)
average #info 0.612 (s.d. 1.25, 
obs. 384)
average #info on P 0.354 ( s.d
0.79, obs. 384)
average #info on M 0.258 ( s.d
0.58, obs. 384)
Fig. 5  Information purchased on P and on M 
11 Remember that one phase lasts 12 periods before groups are reshuffled whereas endowment types 
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Fig. 6  Frequency of donating (> 1 ECU) by R-participants (in PCS)
Fig. 7  Frequency of R-donation (> 1 ECU) and contribution to the public good in GCS
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to the PG, (2) those who only donate, (3) those who only contribute to the PG, (4) 
those who neither donate nor contribute. Most non-blind R-participants engage in 
both, donating and contributing: 90% of the R-participants who invest in informa-
tion donate as well as contribute. In comparison, blind R-participants often only 
contribute although blind donations are higher in GCS than in PCS.
Result 5 In GCS most R-participants (90%) reveal social concerns via costly 
information retrieval, voluntarily contributing and donating
Table 5 on R-donations in GCS (Model 1) rejects “crowding out” of charitable 
donations and confirms a positive effect of R’s own contributions, past own dona-
tions and partly of contribution sums (Models 4 for GCS, Model 2 for pooled data) 
on R-donations. Information retrieval enhances voluntary cooperation of the non-
wealthy in GCS but not in PCS. Only few R-participants, who are substantially 
Table 5  Random-effects tobit model regression on R-donations
Standard errors in parentheses: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
GCS (1) Dependent: pool (2) R-donation PCS (3) GCS (4)
Own contribution 0.272** (0.12)
Sum contribution 0.221*** (0.09) 0.077 (0.16) 0.254*** (0.04)
Donation (t–1) 0.435*** (0.07) 0.477*** (0.04) 0.478*** (0.06) 0.336*** (0.07)
Information acquired 0.337*** (0.06) 0.088 (0.11) − 0.076 (0.21) 0.303*** (0.06)
Female − 0.064 (4.79) − 0.489 (9.71) 1.898 (17.84) − 0.508 (5.22)
Phase 0.513 (1.31) − 2.619 (2.33) − 5.377 (3.98) 1.119 (1.24)
Period − 0.573*** (0.21) − 0.912** (0.37) − 1.371** (0.65) − 0.364* (0.20)
Condition 9.224 (9.91)
Constant − 1.833 (3.97) − 30.428* (15.76) − 22.075 (15.10) − 10.908** (4.39)
N 352 1012 660 352
Table 6  Random-effects 
tobit model regression on 
R-contributions
Standard errors in parentheses. We control the results also by esti-
mating the GMM model using xtabond with one lag period (Arel-
lano and Bond 1991). The results are consistent with the tobit model
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Dependent: R-contribution in GCS
1 2
Own contribution (t–1) 0.179** (0.08)
Sum contribution (t–1) 0.096*** (0.03)
Donation (t–1) 0.292*** (0.05) 0.256*** (0.06)
Information acquired (t–1) − 0.045 (0.05) − 0.038 (0.05)
Female 4.094 (2.88) 4.066 (2.82)
Phase − 2.783*** (0.94) − 2.366** (0.97)
Period − 0.012 (0.15) 0.078 (0.15)
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donating in PCS, monitor and reward higher contributions (Table 4) to inspire vol-
untary cooperation of the non-wealthy.
Table 6, using a random-effects tobit model, reveals how R-contributions in GCS 
are significantly related to own previous contributions (Model 1), past donations, 
as well as to past contribution sums (Model 2). This suggests that R-participants, 
who care for the non-wealthy, do not merely substitute donations by more efficient 
contributions but rather employ both to improve the wellbeing of their fellow group 
members and their society, especially when also retrieving information about indi-
vidual contributions.12 Table 6 reveals lower R-contributions in the second phase but 
not across periods within a phase.
3.3  Payoff Analysis
Figure  8 compares the average payoffs for the three groups across time between 
GCS and PCS. Although average P-payoff (top-left graph in Fig.  8) is smoothly 
decreasing in both conditions, it is significantly higher in GCS than PCS. This holds 






































PCS payoff 26.706 ( s.d. 8.13, obs. 2160)
GCS payoff 31.778 ( s.d. 8.72, obs. 1152)
PCS payoff 66.187 ( s.d. 8.82, obs. 1440)
GCS payoff 71.160 ( s.d. 8.40, obs. 768)
PCS payoff 545.260 ( s.d. 32.62, obs. 720)
GCS payoff 552.427 ( s.d. 22.74, obs. 384)
Fig. 8  Payoff by role and condition. We perform a bootstrapped t test (1000 replications) on the individ-
ual payoff by role checking for significant difference between condition PCS and GCS: for all pairwise 
comparisons (GCS vs. PCS) p values are < 0.001
12 Due to high correlation between donations and information purchased, we find that the latter is signifi-
cant only when we run the same model without donation covariate.
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on average, also better off in GCS than in PCS. On average, no endowment type, P, 
M and R, is worse off under GCS than under PCS institutional rules.
This may be partly due to the higher efficiency of collective good provision when 
R is included. Let us therefore neglect R-contributions when comparing GCS with 
PCS and simulate efficiency without R-contributions. Figure 9 displays the average 
(simulated) payoffs across periods for P- (top-left graph) and M-members (top-right 
graph) when excluding R-contributions.13
Even when R-contributions are excluded average P- and M- payoffs are signifi-
cantly higher in (simulated) GCS than in PCS. The bottom graph in Fig. 9 reports 
simulated R-payoffs for GCS when neglecting their contribution costs and collective 
good benefits but including donations and information costs: the average payoff is 
significantly lower in GCS, partly due to the significantly higher information costs14 
in GCS than in PCS (see Fig. 5).
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0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
Period
PCS GCS applying PCS
R-payoff
PCS payoff 26.706 ( s.d. 8.13, obs. 2160)  
GCS payoff 28.593 (s.d. 7.32, obs. 1152)  
 
PCS payoff 66.187 ( s.d. 8.82, obs. 1440)  
GCS payoff 67.976 ( s.d. 7.17, obs. 768)  
 
PCS payoff 545.260 ( s.d. 32.62, obs. 720)  
GCS payoff 544.331 ( s.d. 22.74, obs. 384) 
 
Fig. 9  Payoff by role and condition, when excluding R-member from public provision in GCS. We per-
form a bootstrapped t test (1000 replications) on the individual payoff by role checking for significant 
difference between conditions PCS and GCS: for P and M pairwise comparisons (GCS vs. PCS) p values 
are < 0.001. The payoff for R does not significantly differ across treatments (p value = 0.602)
13 This implies that we simulate the efficiency level of GCS by excluding the direct effects of R-contri-
butions but not of their indirect ones.
14 Information costs in our setup lower efficiency, which is not necessarily the case in the field where 
they may also generate income and have re-distributional effects.
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Fig. 10  Gini inequality index in PCS and GCS. We perform a bootstrapped t test (1000 replications) 
on individual observations checking for significant difference between condition PCS and GCS: p val-
ues < 0.001
Fig. 11  Gini index by donor types. We perform a bootstrapped t test (1000 replications) on individual 
observations (within treatment) checking for significant difference across donor types: p values < 0.001
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This result is supported by analyzing how dispersed the payoffs are. The Gini 
index15 compares the variation from the initial dispersion of endowments (identical 
in PCS and GCS) with the later inequality in periodic payoffs.
Figure 10 shows that the inequality level is significantly lower across all periods 
in GCS: the inequality level seems to increase across time, but with considerable 
differences across groups.
Figure 11 distinguishes the index dynamics in groups with differently generous 
R (Non-Donor, Small Donor, or Substantial Donor, see Table 4). Clearly, a gener-
ous donor decreases the inequality index. In particular, the inequality index is rising 
for groups whose R is rather opportunistic while it is stable across time when R is a 
substantial donor.
4  Conclusions
Our testbed exploration of potential institutional alternatives does not exclude con-
founding effects, but only tries to limit and control them. From the perspective of 
experimental methodology, PCS and GCS do not qualify as treatments since they 
differ in more than one aspect: The effects of the institutional variations in our setup 
are confounded by changing both the number of voluntary contributors as well as 
the efficiency of contributing.
Our results nevertheless suggest to rely on GCS rather than PCS if these are the 
two options of a constitutional/institutional choice: Compared to PCS the institu-
tional setting GCS enhances voluntary cooperation letting all endowment classes 
gain on average. The non-wealthy contribute more in GCS and only very few R-par-
ticipants react to compulsory participation in non-discriminatory solidarity by nei-
ther contributing nor donating. R-members mostly retrieve costly information about 
individual contributions of the others and try to enhance their contributions by con-
ditioning own contributions and donations on behavior of others. We also find that 
R-participants in GCS do not merely substitute donating by more efficient contri-
butions but maintain retrieving information about contributions by the non-wealthy 
and use both mechanisms to improve the wellbeing of others in the group thereby 
reducing there potential resentment against supporting the “non-deserving”.
We did not argue for or against compulsory solidarity nor did we discuss whether 
and when general compulsory solidarity is ethically, legally, or otherwise preferable. 
We have shown though that in our experimental setup GCS seems, economically 
and according to evaluative standards of customary morals, superior. We believe 
that the experiment raises interesting questions concerning the relation between 
non-discriminatory redistribution, as in unconditional basic income scheme favored 
15 We adopt the geometrical approach to compute the Gini index as the sum of the individual fraction 
geometrical areas in the unit box: each area is based on the wealth of the fraction of population consid-
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under principles of equal legal treatment, and discriminatory redistribution by tar-
geted donations through private agents.
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Introduction Welcome to our experiment!
During this experiment you will be asked to make several decisions, and so will 
the other participants. Your decisions, as well as the decisions of the other partici-
pants will determine your payoff according to rules, which will be explained below. 
What you earn during the experiment will be converted to euros at the rate of ECU 
(Experimental Currency Unit) 10 ECU = 80cent. In addition to the earnings from 
your decisions over the course of the experiment, you will receive a show-up fee of 
€4.00.
Please note that hereafter any form of communication between participants is 
strictly prohibited. If you violate this rule, you will be excluded from the experiment 
with no payment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. The experi-
menter will come to you and answer your questions individually.
Description of the Experiment This experiment is fully computerized. The experi-
ment has two phases (Phase 1, Phase 2). Each phase consists of 12 identical periods, 
in which you will be required to perform a Task as explained below.
During the experiment, groups of six participants will be randomly formed, and 
in every period of the same Phase you will be interacting with the same group of 
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anonymous participants (how to interact with the others will be explained shortly). 
At the end of each phase, the computer will randomly form new groups.
Description of the Task At the beginning of the experiment, the computer will select 
your role. There are three possible roles; you can be P-type, M-type or R-type. Your 
role will never change during the experiment.
In each phase a group of 6 participants is formed: the group is formed by 1 
R-type, 2 M-type and 3 P-type participants.
The task of each participant type is different:
• Description of the task for P
In each period, you and the other P-type individuals are endowed with 20 ECU.
P-type participants (and participants of M-type) of your group have to decide, 
individually and independently, how much of their endowment they want to contrib-
ute to a project (from 0 to 20 ECU).
Given the amount you contribute cp, your payoff from the project is determined in 
each period according to the following formula:
 where Total Contribution is the sum of the individual contributions by three par-
ticipants of P-type and two participants of M-type of your group; that is, Total 
Contribution = cp1 + cp2 + cp3 + cm1 + cm2.
After all participants decided on their contribution, the computer will inform you 
about the Total Contribution and your individual payoff. 
• Description of the task for M
In each period, you and the other M-type individual are endowed with 60 ECU.
M-type participants (and participants of P-type) of your group have to decide, 
individually and independently, how much of their endowment they want to con-
tribute to a project (from 0 to 20 ECU). This implies you cannot contribute your full 
endowment, but up to one-third of your total endowment.
Given the amount you contribute cm, your payoff from the project is determined 
in each period according to the following formula:
where Total Contribution = cp1 + cp2 + cp3 + cm1 + cm2.
After all participants decided on their contribution, the computer will inform you 
about the Total Contribution and your individual payoff.
• Description of the task for R
In each period, you are endowed with 560 ECU.
(1)20 − cp + 0.4 (Total Contribution)
(2)60 − cm + 0.4 (Total Contribution)
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Firstly, participants of M-type and participants of P-type of your group have to 
decide, individually and independently, how much of their endowment they want to 
contribute to a project.
After all participants decided on their contribution, the computer will communi-
cate to you the Total Contribution to their project. The project result does not have 
any effect on your situation.
Secondly, a screen with five buttons appears on your screen; there are three but-
tons for P-types (button names are cp1, cp2 and cp3) and two buttons M-types (but-
ton names are cm1 and cm2). Each of the buttons represents a single information on 
that group member’s individual contribution. You can decide to collect information 
about none/some/all individual contributions clicking on each button.
Retrieving the information is costly: each click on such a button costs you 
10ECU.
After collecting information on other group members’ contributions, a new 
screen will appear. Under each button, for each member of your group, there is an 
empty text cell, where you, R, can write for each group member, how much of your 
endowment you want to donate to that member.
You can donate from 0 to the maximum you are left with–after all your previous 
donations and information purchasing decisions–to a single participant. You cannot 
donate more than the ECU you are left with after purchasing information.
Your payoff is:
560−sum of information cost−sum of donations to group members.
Note that participants will be associated with the same name through the entire 
phase, so the button of cp1 always refers to the same participant in all periods of the 
same phase.
Information Feedback Before proceeding to the next period, the computer will 
inform each group member P and M about their final payoff, respectively the R-mem-
ber about the final payoff and the sum of the project payoff plus donations.
• Summing up, your payoff for each period will depend: If you are P-type or 
M-type, on your initial decision to contribute and the donation received by the 
R-type participant;
• If you are the R-type, on the number of information retrievals you purchase and 
on donations to other group members.
End of the Experiment After completing the experiment, that is when the two phases 
will be over, a lottery administrated by the computer will randomly select one phase 
and one period of it to be considered for payment and will display on your screen the 
corresponding numerical payoff you made in that period.
Your total payoff from the experiment will be equal to the sum of:
• the payoff that you realized in the selected period of the selected phase.
• €4 of show up fee.
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A summary screen will display the total points you have accumulated and the 
corresponding earnings in euros. Please remain at your cubicle until asked to come 
forward and receive payment for the experiment. After having finished the experi-
ment, but before receiving your payoff, you will be asked also to fill up a short ques-
tionnaire about your demographics and other few questions.
Instructions to Participants (GCS)
Introduction Welcome to our experiment!
During this experiment you will be asked to make several decisions, and 
so will the other participants. Your decisions, as well as the decisions of the 
other participants will determine your payoff according to rules, which will be 
explained below. What you earn during the experiment will be converted to euros 
at the rate of ECU (Experimental Currency Unit) 10 ECU = 80cent. In addition 
to the earnings from your decisions over the course of the experiment, you will 
receive a show-up fee of €4.00.
Please note that hereafter any form of communication between the participants 
is strictly prohibited. If you violate this rule, you will be excluded from the exper-
iment with no payment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. The 
experimenter will come to you and answer your questions individually.
Description of the Experiment This experiment is fully computerized. The experi-
ment is composed of two phases (Phase 1, Phase 2). Each phase consists of 12 
identical periods, in which you will be required to perform a task as explained 
below.
During the experiment, groups of six participants will be randomly formed, 
and in every period of the same Phase you will be interacting with the same 
group of anonymous participants (how to interact with the other will be explained 
shortly). At the end of each phase, the computer will randomly form new groups.
Description of  the Task At the beginning of the experiment, the computer will 
select your role. There are three possible roles; you can be of P-type, M-type or 
R-type. Your role will never change during the experiment.
In each phase a group of six participants is formed: the group is formed by 1 
R-type, 2 M-type and 3 P-type participants.
The task of each participant type is different:
• Description of the task for P
In each period, you and the other P-type individuals are endowed with 20 ECU.
P-type participants (and participants of M- and R-type) of your group have to 
decide, individually and independently, how much of their endowment they want 
to contribute to a project (from 0 to 20 ECU).
273
1 3
Homo Oeconomicus (2019) 36:249–279 
Given the amount you contribute cp, your payoff from the project is determined 
in each period according to the following formula:
where Total Contribution is the sum of the individual contributions by three par-
ticipants of P-type, 2 participants of M-type and one participant of R type of your 
group; that is, Total Contribution = cp1 + cp2 + cp3 + cm1 + cm2 + cr.
After all participants decided on their contribution, the computer will inform 
you about the Total Contribution and your individual payoff.
• Description of the task for M
In each period, you and the other M type individual are endowed with 60 ECU.
M-type participants (and participants of P- and R-type) of your group have to 
decide, individually and independently, how much of their endowment they want 
to contribute to a project (from 0 to 20 ECU). This implies you cannot contribute 
your full endowment, but up to one-third of your total endowment.
Given the amount you contribute cm, your payoff from the project is deter-
mined in each period according to the following formula:
where Total Contribution = cp1 + cp2 + cp3 + cm1 + cm2 + cr.
After all participants decided on their contribution, the computer will inform 
you about the Total Contribution and your individual payoff.
• Description of the task for R
In each period, you are endowed with 560 ECU.
Firstly, participants of R-type (and participants P- and M-type) of your group 
have to decide, individually and independently, how much of their endowment 
they want to contribute to a project (from 0 to 20 ECU). This implies you cannot 
contribute your full endowment.
Given the amount you contribute cr, your payoff from the project is determined 
in each period according to the following formula:
where Total Contribution = cp1 + cp2 + cp3 + cm1 + cm2+ cr.
After all participants decided on their contribution, the computer will inform 
you about the Total Contribution and your individual payoff.
Secondly, a screen with five buttons appears on your screen; there are three 
buttons for P-types (button names are cp1, cp2 and cp3) and two buttons for 
M-types (button names are cm1 and cm2). Each of the buttons represents a single 
information on that group member’s individual contributions. You can decide to 
collect information about none/some/all individual contributions clicking on each 
button.
(3)20 − cp + 0.4 (Total Contribution)
(4)60 − cm + 0.4 (Total Contribution)
(5)560 − cr + 0.4 (Total Contribution)
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Retrieving the information is costly: each click on such a button costs you 10 
ECU.
After collecting information on other group members contributions, a new screen 
will appear. Under each button, for each member of your group, there is an empty 
text cell, where you, R, can write for each group member, how much of your endow-
ment you want to donate to that member.
You can donate from 0 to the maximum you are left with—after all your previous 
donations and information purchasing decisions—to a single participant. You can-
not donate more than the ECU you are left with after purchasing information.
Your payoff is:
560 − cr +0.4 (Total Contribution) − sum of information cost − sum of dona-
tions to group members Note that participants will be associated with the same 
name through the entire phase, so the button of cp1 always refers to the same par-
ticipant in all periods of the same phase.
Information Feedback Before proceeding to the next period, the computer will 
inform each group member P and M about their final payoff, respectively the 
R-members about the sum of the project payoff plus donations.
Summing up, your payoff for each period will depend:
If you are P-type or M-type, on your initial decision to contribute and the 
donation received by R-type participant;
• If you are the R-type, on your initial decision to contribute, on the number of 
information retrievals you purchase, and on donations to other group mem-
bers.
End of the Experiment After completing the experiment, that is when the two phases 
will be over, a lottery administrated by the computer will randomly select one phase 
and one period of it to be considered for payment and will display it on your screen 
the corresponding numerical payoff you made in that period.
Your total payoff from the experiment will be equal to the sum of:
• the payoff that you realized in the selected period of the selected phase
• €4 of show up fee.
A summary screen will display the total points you have accumulated and the 
corresponding earnings in euros. Please remain at your cubicle until asked to 
come forward and receive payment for the experiment. After having finished the 
experiment, but before receiving your payoff, you will be asked also to fill up a 
short questionnaire about your demographics and other few questions.
Appendix B: Tables and Figures
See Figs. 12, 13; Tables 7, 8 and 9.
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Fig. 12  Average individual donation by phase and condition
Fig. 13  Average (positive) donation by blind and non-blind R-participants. We include the wealthy which 
have donated at least one ECU to at least one member of the group
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Table 8  Multilevel models on R-donations
Standard errors in parentheses: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Fixed Dependent: R-donation
(1) (2) (3)
Own contribution 0.203*** (0.07) 0.203*** (0.07) 0.170** (0.07)
Donation (t–1) 0.512*** (0.04) 0.512*** (0.04) 0.441*** (0.04)
# Information acquired 0.344*** (0.04) 0.344*** (0.04) 0.336*** (0.04)
Female − 0.231 (0.89) -0.231 (0.89) − 0.446 (1.42)
Phase 1.422* (0.82) 1.422* (0.82) 1.146 (0.81)
Period − 0.146 (0.13) − 0.146 (0.13) − 0.193 (0.13)
Constant − 0.525 (1.77) − 0.525 (1.77) 1.307 (1.91)
Session constant − 16.163 (12.50)
Group constant − 12.623 (921.81) − 21.901 (1581.03)
Individual constant − 12.623 (920.86) − 21.367*** (3.98) 0.730* (0.38)
N 352 352 352
LR test vs. linear model (prob) 0.000 0.000 4.031
Likelihood-ratio test (p value). Assumption: lower level nested in higher one
4–3 level 1.000
3–2 level 1.000
Table 9  Multilevel models R-contributions
Standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Fixed Dependent: r-contribution in GCS
(1) (2) (3)
Own contribution (t–1) 0.075 (0.05) 0.066 (0.05) 0.148*** (0.05)
Donation (t–1) 0.220*** (0.03) 0.206*** (0.03) 0.222*** (0.03)
# Information acquired (t–1) − 0.025 (0.03) − 0.023 (0.03) − 0.045 (0.03)
Female 2.617** (1.27) 2.181* (1.27) 2.042 (1.32)
Phase − 1.962* (1.04) − 2.008* (1.18) − 1.865*** (0.61)
Period 0.012 (0.09) 0.005 (0.09) 0.009 (0.09)
Constant 7.304*** (2.05) 7.763*** (2.13) 6.880*** (1.51)
Session constant 0.342 (0.56)
Group constant 0.532 (7.83) 0.717 (21.94)
Individual constant 0.532 (7.83) 0.717 (21.94) 0.755*** (0.26)
N 352 352 352
LR test vs. linear model (prob) 19.026 16.787 14.773
Likelihood-ratio test (p-value). Assumption: lower level nested in higher one
4-3 level 0.135
3-2 level 0.1518
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